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Proposition 187 and the Legacy of Its
Law Enforcement Provisions
Huyen Pham*
Passed by a wide margin of California voters in 1994, Prop. 187 is
primarily remembered as a law that tried to deny state-funded health care
and education to unauthorized immigrants. Far less attention has been paid
to Section Four in Prop. 187 that required all law enforcement agencies
(LEAs) in California to “fully cooperate” with federal immigration
authorities. Specifically, these provisions required LEAs to verify the legal
status of any arrestee “suspected” of being in the U.S. unlawfully, notify the
arrestee of his/her unlawful status, and report the arrestee to state and
federal immigration authorities.
Though never enforced, Section Four played an extremely important role
in introducing the concept of LEA enforcement into our immigration policy
debates. Prior to the passage of Section Four, the idea that LEAs should be
involved in immigration enforcement on a regularized and mandatory basis
simply did not exist. The intense publicity around Prop. 187 and subsequent
efforts to enact Prop. 187-type laws in other states nationalized the
immigration enforcement debate. At the federal level, the result was the
creation of the voluntary 287(g) program and the passage of a federal “antisanctuary” law. At the state level, states enacted laws that mirrored the
mandatory nature of Prop. 187 more closely, requiring LEAs within the
states to check the immigration status of people arrested for other offenses.
This article explores the influence of Section Four on LEA enforcement of
immigration laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Passed by California voters in 1994, Proposition 187 (“Prop. 187”) is
known primarily as a law that tried to deny publicly-funded health care
and educational services to immigrants without legal immigration
status.1 Proponents framed the proposition as “strik[ing] a blow for the
taxpayer” — emphasizing the financial costs of providing public
services to unauthorized immigrants and the financial savings in tax
revenues if those services were cut off.2 In written arguments submitted
in support of Prop. 187, its authors wrote: “It has been estimated that
ILLEGAL ALIENS are costing taxpayers in excess of 5 billion dollars a
year. While our own citizens and legal residents go wanting, those who
choose to enter our country ILLEGALLY get royal treatment at the
expense of the California taxpayer.”3
The debate about Prop. 187 has focused largely on the legal and policy
implications of its service denial provisions.4 Far less attention has been
paid to provisions in Prop. 187 that required all law enforcement
agencies in California to “fully cooperate” with federal immigration
authorities.5 Section Four of Prop. 187, entitled “Law Enforcement
Cooperation with INS” provides in full:
Section 834b is added to the Penal Code, to read:
834b. (a) Every law enforcement agency in California shall fully
cooperate with the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service regarding any person who is arrested if he or she is
suspected of being present in the United States in violation of
federal immigration laws.
(b) With respect to any such person who is arrested, and suspected
of being present in the United States in violation of federal
1 Immediately after passage, challengers filed lawsuits, and the proposition’s
provisions were enjoined; the lawsuit was eventually settled through mediation, with
the result that the provisions were never implemented. See infra notes 68–72.
2 Proposition 187: Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and
Reporting (1994), at 54, available at http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_
props/1104 [https://perma.cc/LNP8-9XEM] [hereinafter Proposition 187].
3 Id. (capitalization in original).
4 See, e.g., Suzanne Gamboa, How an Anti-Immigrant Initiative Mobilized Latinos —
and Turned California Blue, NBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2019, 3:41 AM), https://www.nbcnews.
com/news/latino/how-anti-immigrant-ballot-initiative-mobilized-latinos-turnedcalifornia-blue-n1078361 [https://perma.cc/GP3H-8KJW] (describing Prop. 187 as
“den[ying] health care, education and other services to anyone believed to be illegally
in the country” and analyzing its impact on Latino political participation).
5 Proposition 187, supra note 2, at 91.
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immigration laws, every law enforcement agency shall do the
following:
(1) Attempt to verify the legal status of such person as a citizen of
the United States, an alien lawfully admitted as a permanent
resident, an alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time
or as an alien who is present in the United States in violation of
immigration laws. The verification process may include, but shall
not be limited to, questioning the person regarding his or her date
and place of birth, and entry into the United States, and demanding
documentation to indicate his or her legal status.
(2) Notify the person of his or her apparent status as an alien who
is present in the United States in violation of federal immigration
laws and inform him or her that, apart from any criminal justice
proceedings, he or she must either obtain legal status or leave the
United States.
(3) Notify the Attorney General of California and the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the apparent illegal
status and provide any additional information that may be
requested by any other public entity.
(c) Any legislative, administrative, or other action by a city,
county, or other legally authorized local governmental entity with
jurisdictional boundaries, or by a law enforcement agency, to
prevent or limit the cooperation required by subdivision (a) is
expressly prohibited.6
The main import of these provisions — that law enforcement agencies
(“LEAs”) are required to cooperate with federal immigration authorities
— is a concept firmly embedded in today’s legal landscape. At the state
level, Arizona, South Carolina, and other states require their LEAs to
check immigration status of arrestees; at the federal level, there are
programs that either encourage LEA participation in immigration
enforcement (like the voluntary 287(g) program) or try to coerce that
participation through threats to cut federal funding.7 Yet in 1994, as the
provisions of Prop. 187 were being debated, these programs and laws
6

Id.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2019) (creating the 287(g) program); S.B. 1070, 49th Leg.,
2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); H. 4919, 2009–2010 Gen. Assemb., 118th Sess. (S.C. 2010);
Martin Kaste, Trump Threatens ‘Sanctuary’ Cities with Loss of Federal Funds, NPR (Jan. 26,
2017, 11:06 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/26/511899896/
trumps-threatens-sanctuary-cities-with-loss-of-federal-funds [https://perma.cc/FVV6J6DN].
7
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did not yet exist. Indeed, Prop. 187 played an extremely important role
in introducing the concept of LEA immigration enforcement into
immigration policy debates. The intense publicity around Prop. 187 and
subsequent efforts to enact Prop. 187-type laws in other states
nationalized these debates.8 At the federal level, the result was the
codification of LEA immigration enforcement through the creation of
the voluntary 287(g) program and the passage of a federal “antisanctuary” law that prohibits local governments from hindering
communication between LEAs and federal immigration authorities.9 At
the state level, states enacted laws that mirrored the mandatory nature
of Prop. 187, requiring LEAs within the states to check the immigration
status of people arrested for other offenses.10
This Article explores the development and influence of these law
enforcement cooperation provisions within Prop. 187. Part I gives
context to these provisions: what were the goals of Prop. 187’s authors,
both in drafting the proposition generally and in including these
specific provisions? Did voters perceive these same goals? Part II
analyzes the legal and policy landscape that existed in 1994, in relation
to LEA enforcement of immigration laws. Looking at case law, policies
of different law enforcement agencies across the country, and a
sanctuary movement that was motivated by concerns largely unrelated
to LEA enforcement of immigration laws, I conclude that the issue, with
all of its attendant controversies, was simply not of high enough
importance to immigration debates of the time. Finally, having
established the uniqueness of the law enforcement cooperation
provisions in Prop. 187, I explore their influence on both federal and
state laws in Part III.
I.

LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION PROVISIONS IN CONTEXT

On November 8, 1994, California voters approved Prop. 187 by a
substantial margin, 58.8% for and 41.2% against.11 Polling done by the
Los Angeles Times in October 1994 showed that the proposition enjoyed
wide support among likely voters, 59% for to 33% against, a lead that

8 See Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1375-76
(2013).
9 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g); 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2019); 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2019)
(prohibiting restrictions on communications between local governments and federal
immigration authorities).
10 See, e.g., S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
11 Proposition 187, supra note 2, at 54.
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shrank to 51% to 41% two weeks before the election.12 The
demographics of voters who supported the measure provide interesting
insights into the state’s politics at that time: support for Prop. 187 was
strongest among white non-Hispanic voters (64% for, 36% against),
while Latinos voted overwhelmingly against Prop. 187 (27% for, 73%
against). Strong Latino opposition to Prop. 187, however, was diluted
by weak voter turnout in this group: only 9% of voters in the 1994
election were Latino, even though the group made up 15% of citizen
eligible voters and 24% of all adults in California at that time.13 The
passage of Prop. 187 amidst evidence of low Latino voter turnout is
often credited for mobilizing Latino political participation and turning
California solidly Democratic.14
A. SOS Committee: “Legislative” Intent
Prop. 187 was written and placed on the ballot through the efforts of
the “Save Our State” committee (“SOS”), a collection of political
novices, seasoned operatives, and one former head of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (“INS”), Alan C. Nelson.15 Because Prop. 187
was a voter initiative, it lacks the committee reports, floor debates, and
other traditional sources of legislative history.16 This dearth of
information makes it difficult to trace the origin of the law enforcement
cooperation provisions specifically.
But by analyzing interviews and written statements of SOS members,
SOS’s primary focus becomes evident: to deny benefits to unauthorized
immigrants. Law enforcement cooperation provisions were viewed as
just one component of that larger campaign. From its campaign
12 See Paul Feldman & Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Backers Elated — Challenges
Imminent, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 9, 1994, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/laxpm-1994-11-09-mn-60571-story.html [https://perma.cc/U2T5-7JUT].
13 See FIELD INST., A SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VOTING IN THE 1994 GENERAL ELECTION 2
(1995), https://web.archive.org/web/20101020160337/http://field.com/fieldpollonline/
subscribers/COI-94-95-Jan-Election.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9R4-3TG4].
14 See Alex Nowrasteh, Proposition 187 Turned California Blue, CATO INST. (July 20,
2016, 3:13 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/proposition-187-turned-california-blue
[https://perma.cc/E4FD-TZ27].
15 See Gebe Martinez & Doreen Carvajal, Creators of Prop. 187 Largely Escape
Spotlight: Ballot: From Secret O.C. Location, Political Novices and Veterans Spawn Strong
Drive Against Illegal Immigration, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 4, 1994, 12:00 AM), https://www.
latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-09-04-mn-34888-story.html [https://perma.cc/XDP2LD7G].
16 See AIMEE DUDOVITZ, HETHER C. MACFARLANE & SUZANNE E. ROWE, CALIFORNIA
LEGAL RESEARCH 100-01 (3d ed. 2016) (describing the initiative and referendum process
in California and suggesting research methods).
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headquarters in Orange County, the SOS committee pitched the
initiative as a way to “Save Our State” from “economic and social
bankruptcy” by denying public benefits to unauthorized immigrants.17
The law enforcement cooperation provisions are rarely mentioned in
SOS materials, and when they are mentioned, the reference is cursory.
For example, in its written arguments to support Prop. 187, SOS asked
these (rhetorical) questions:
•

Should those ILLEGALLY here receive taxpayer
subsidized education including college?

•

Should our children’s classrooms be over-crowded by
those ILLEGALLY in our country?

•

Should our Senior Citizens be denied full service under
Medi-Cal to subsidize the cost of ILLEGAL ALIENS?

•

Should those ILLEGALLY here be able to buy and sell
forged documents without penalty?

•

Should tax-paid bureaucrats be able to give sanctuary to
those ILLEGALLY in our country?18

The last two questions hint at the substance of the law enforcement
cooperation provisions but only with oblique references to identity
fraud and sanctuary. These questions lack any reference to the rationale
that we now associate with modern day cooperation statutes, i.e., that
the massive enforcement power of LEAs should be harnessed to help
remove unauthorized and presumably dangerous immigrants from the
country.19 Of course, imposing cooperation requirements on LEAs is
entirely consistent with the goal of reducing public spending on
government services (on the theory that more LEA cooperation would
presumably lead to the removal of more unauthorized immigrants and
thus save the state money by providing fewer services). The crucial
takeaway is that Prop. 187’s organizers did not appear to view the
removal of unauthorized immigrants as an end in itself but rather, as
one of many possible means to reduce state spending on social services.
The primacy of this financial argument is made clearer in the conclusion
of SOS’s written arguments, where the committee made yet another
17

Proposition 187, supra note 2, at 54.
Id. (capitalization in the original).
19 See Brewer Signs SB 1070 - Illegal Immigration Bill, AZ GOVERNOR: EYE ON THE 9TH
FLOOR BLOG (Apr. 23, 2010, 3:28 PM), https://azgovernor.blogspot.com/2010/04/
brewer-signs-sb-1070-illegal.html. [https://perma.cc/B5AX-YX6S].
18
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reference to the negative financial impact of providing services to
unauthorized immigrants:
We were outraged when our State Legislature voted on July 5th
to remove dental care as a medical option and force the increase
of the cost of prescription drugs for Senior Citizens. Then, as a
final slap in the face, they voted to continue free pre-natal care
for ILLEGAL ALIENS!20
The benefits focus is also apparent in an op-ed written by Ron Prince,
chairman of the SOS committee.21 An accountant by training, Prince
played a particularly important role in the passage of Prop. 187. In an
initial gathering of the people who would later form the SOS
Committee, he came up with the strategy of a statewide initiative to end
publicly-funded services to unauthorized immigrants.22 Writing in the
Los Angeles Times, Prince framed the merits of Prop. 187 as a fiscally
sound way “to deal with those [unauthorized immigrants] already
here.” He referenced the law enforcement cooperation provisions, but,
again, framed them as part of a bigger plan to save money for California
taxpayers.
Once illegal aliens arrive in California, the burden falls on the
state, not the federal government. Proposition 187 would
lighten that burden by ending public benefits paid for health,
education and welfare for illegal aliens. It would require lawenforcement agencies to cooperate with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service and report all those under arrest for other
crimes and subsequently suspected of being here illegally. . . .
Rather than support and harbor illegal aliens, California will
report them to the INS.23
According to Prince, Section Four’s reporting requirements (like the
reporting requirements imposed on schools and medical care providers)
provided an alternative to “support[ing] and harbor[ing] illegal aliens.”
Presumably, Section Four would save state funding by either reporting
unauthorized immigrants for removal or discouraging their presence in
California in the first place. But based on the materials generated by its
20

Proposition 187, supra note 2, at 54 (capitalization in the original).
See Ron Prince, Americans Want Illegal Immigrants Out: The Cost of Tending to
Them and Their Children Has Overwhelmed the State. Why not Draw the Line at the School
Door?, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 6, 1994, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm1994-09-06-me-35169-story.html [https://perma.cc/2AW2-CWQY].
22 See Martinez & Carvajal, supra note 15.
23 See Prince, supra note 21 (emphasis added).
21
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authors, the “legislative” intent of Prop. 187 was squarely focused on
the denial of state benefits and the presumed savings of state funds.24
B. Reporting Requirements for All Service Providers
The secondary importance of the law enforcement cooperation
provisions is also apparent from the structure of Prop. 187. The
initiative placed affirmative obligations on LEAs to ascertain the
immigration status of arrestees who are “suspected” of unauthorized
status and then to report those unauthorized immigrants to both the
California Attorney General and to INS;25 standing alone, these
obligations are substantial and echo the obligations placed on LEAs
through Arizona’s SB1070 and similar laws.26 But Prop. 187 placed the
same obligations on providers of publicly-funded social services, health
care, and education (both K-12 and post-secondary).27 Against this
context of universal reporting obligations, the reporting obligations
placed on LEAs specifically take on secondary importance: Instead of
an enforcement scheme where LEAs play the central role in checking
immigration status and then reporting unauthorized immigrants for
possible removal (like the scheme envisioned by SB 1070 and similar
laws), Prop. 187 created a structure where an LEA was just one among
many service providers with these reporting obligations.
Similarly, opponents of Prop. 187 paid little attention to Section Four,
focusing their firepower instead on the initiative provisions that denied
services to unauthorized immigrants. In a written opposition statement,
the sheriff of Los Angeles County and the presidents of the California
Teachers Association and the California Medical Association
emphasized the fiscal costs of Prop. 187. Those costs included the
federal funding that would be lost because of conflicts between Prop.
187’s requirements and those of federal programs. Furthermore, schools
would be required to divert educational spending as they would be
forced to turn their time and energy toward checking immigration
status. These opponents also emphasized the public health implications
of denying medical care to unauthorized immigrants who picked the

24 In an interview published in the Los Angeles Times, Robert Kiley, a member of the
SOS Committee, said “I believe in this issue.” Referring to tax money that he says is
being wasted on unauthorized immigrants, he commented, “As a tax-paying citizen, I’m
feeling pinches like everyone else.” Martinez & Carvajal, supra note 15.
25 Proposition 187, supra note 2, at 91.
26 See, e.g., S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
27 See Proposition 187, supra note 2, at 91-92.
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state’s crops and worked in the state’s restaurants.28 They briefly
addressed policing and crime but rejected the idea that Prop. 187 would
lead to increased deportations:
An estimated 400,000 KIDS would be kicked out of school, but
Proposition 187 WON’T result in their deportation. Just what
we need — 400,000 kids hanging out on street corners. We all
know what happens to kids who don’t finish school. Is this
supposed to reduce CRIME and GRAFFITI? PROPOSITION
187 CREATES A POLICE STATE MENTALITY.29
Like the proponents of Prop. 187, the opponents did not focus on
Section Four. In fact, the opponents even argued that implementing
Prop. 187 would not increase deportations.
C. The Will of the Voters
Finally, for voters who supported Prop. 187, neither Section Four nor
the potential deportation of more unauthorized immigrants was a
motivating factor. Rather, these voters were more focused on the
symbolic effects of the initiative, as well as the fiscal savings that the
initiative promised. According to Los Angeles Times exit polling, 78% of
those who voted for Prop. 187 did so because it sent a message to
politicians.30 Other popular reasons cited by polled voters for
supporting Prop. 187: forcing the federal government to face the issue
(51%), stopping immigrants from using state services (33%), and saving
the state money (32%).31 So voters, like members of the SOS Committee
and opponents of Prop. 187, viewed the initiative’s importance
primarily in fiscal and symbolic terms.
II.

THE LANDSCAPE FOR LEA COOPERATION IN THE 1990S

This Part explores the legal and policy landscape that existed
regarding LEA cooperation in the early 1990s, as the law enforcement
cooperation provisions of Prop. 187 were being formulated. As noted in
Part I, the origins and inspiration for the provisions are not clear, due
to the lack of traditional legislative history for voter initiatives like Prop.
187. Part II emphasizes the unique nature of those provisions. As

28

See id. at 55.
Id. (capitalization in original).
30 See Elliott R. Barkan, Return of the Nativists? California Public Opinion and
Immigration in the 1980s and 1990s, 27 SOC. SCI. HIST. 229, 264 (2003).
31 See id.
29
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explored in more detail in Part III, the uniqueness of Prop. 187’s law
enforcement cooperation provisions magnified their influence on
subsequent federal and state legislation related to LEA immigration
enforcement.
A. The Norm of Nonenforcement
In the early 1990s, as the provisions of Prop. 187 were being
formulated, few LEAs were involved in enforcing immigration laws.
LEA enforcement of federal immigration laws was simply not a
significant issue in that time.32 Most LEAs that chose not to participate
did so quietly, without issuing policies or procedures.33 Some nonparticipating LEAs did issue formal policies.34 For example, in 1992, the
Houston Police Department (“HPD”) outlined procedures limiting the
authority of their officers to enforce federal immigration laws.35 (1) An
officer in the HPD was not authorized to arrest or detain a person solely
based on the officer’s belief that the person lacks lawful immigration
status.36 (2) If the officer did stop someone for a nonimmigration
violation, the officer was prohibited from asking about the person’s
immigration status.37 (3) For arrestees, the officer was only allowed to
contact INS if the person was arrested on a criminal charge more serious
than a Class C misdemeanor and the officer knows that the person lacks
legal immigration status.38
What motivated LEAs to issue these policies? For the Houston Police
Department, its policy was enacted to preserve its relationship of trust
with immigrant communities, enabling it to better protect public

32 In a separate research project, the author and Professor Pham Hoang Van of
Baylor University created the Immigrant Climate Index (“ICI”), a unique measure of
the immigration climate created by subfederal immigration regulations. The ICI starts
measuring in 2005, the first year of significant subfederal immigration activity. See
Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, Subfederal Immigration Regulation and the Trump
Effect, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125, 131-45 (2019) (describing the authors’ ICI project).
33 See Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why
Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 965, 968-69 (2004) (describing the norm of LEA nonenforcement in 2004).
34 See General Order from Sam Nuchia, Chief of Police, Hous. Police Dep’t, to the
Hous. Police Dep’t (June 25, 1992) (on file with author).
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See id.
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safety.39 “Without the assurances they will not be deported, many illegal
immigrants with critical information would not come forward,” said
Craig Ferrell, deputy director and administrative general counsel for the
HPD Chief’s Command Legal Services.40 Ferrell further noted that,
“[p]olice depend on the cooperation of immigrant communities to help
them solve all sorts of crimes and to maintain public order.”41 As the
HPD order states, “we must rely upon the cooperation of all persons,
including citizens, documented aliens, and undocumented aliens, in
our effort to maintain public order and combat crime.”42
Some LEAs with noncooperation policies were located in cities that
had declared themselves to be “sanctuaries.”43 The original sanctuary
movement of the 1980s started with churches, which protested the
refusal of the U.S. government to fairly consider the asylum claims of
those fleeing civil war in Central America.44 Mostly located along the
United States-Mexico border, these churches set up a network to
provide transportation and shelter to fleeing Central Americans.45 Some
cities embraced the political message of the movement, declaring
themselves sanctuaries against federal immigration enforcement.46 One
of the earliest cities to join the sanctuary movement was Cambridge,
Mass.47 In its 1985 policy, Cambridge opposed federal policies that
denied asylum and sought deportation of Central Americans from El
Salvador and Guatemala.48 And in a precursor of the sanctuary policies
that are commonplace today, Cambridge declared that:
•

“no department or employee of the City of Cambridge
will violate established or future sanctuaries by
officially assisting or voluntarily cooperating with
investigations or arrest procedures, public or
clandestine, relating to alleged violations of

39 See Peggy O’Hare, Houston Police’s Policy on Immigrants: Hands Off, HOUS. CHRON.
(Mar. 3, 2003, 6:30 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Houstonpolice-s-policy-on-immigrants-hands-off-2109308.php [https://perma.cc/D4TY-YYWQ].
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 General Order from Sam Nuchia to Hous. Police Dep’t, supra note 34.
43 See, e.g., CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CITY COUNCIL ORDER no. 4 (1985).
44 See Kristina M. Campbell, Operation Sojourner: The Government Infiltration of the
Sanctuary Movement in the 1980s and Its Legacy on the Modern Central American Refugee
Crisis, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 474, 475-77 (2017).
45 See id. at 478.
46 See, e.g., CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CITY COUNCIL ORDER no. 4 (1985).
47 See id.
48 See id.
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immigration law by refugees from El Salvador,
Guatemala or Haiti, or by those offering sanctuary . . .
•

“no city employee or department, to the extent legally
possible, will request information about or otherwise
assist in the investigation of the citizenship status of any
City resident, will disseminate information regarding
the citizenship of a City resident, or condition the
provision of City of Cambridge services or benefits on
matters related to citizenship . . .”49

By 1994, some cities in California had adopted similar sanctuary
policies; those cities included Los Angeles, San Francisco, Sacramento,
Oakland, and Berkeley.50 The presence of these sanctuary cities in
California and the critical political attention they received may have
inspired the anti-sanctuary provision in Prop. 187.51
B. Limited Enforcement and the Resulting Legal Challenges
At the other end of the spectrum, some LEAs did engage in
immigration law enforcement by making arrests for immigration
offenses.52 The instances of enforcement become apparent when we
analyze the legal challenges to them and the resulting judicial
opinions.53 The question that courts wrestled with was essentially the
same in all these cases: did the participating LEA have the authority to
engage in immigration law enforcement?
The most widely cited decision is Gonzales v. City of Peoria, a 1983
decision from the Ninth Circuit.54 In that case, the eleven plaintiffs
alleged that the Peoria Police Department (Ariz.) (“PPD”)
unconstitutionally stopped and arrested persons of Mexican descent
49

Id.
See Ronald J. Ostrow, Big Cities Criticized for Failing to Cooperate with INS:
Policy: Sen. Roth Says Many, Like Los Angeles, are ‘Hypocritical’ for Complaining of
Influx of Illegal Immigrants While Refusing to Help Prosecute, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 11, 1993,
12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-11-11-mn-55561-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6WQS-YEMP].
51 See, e.g., id. (describing criticism of sanctuary policies of large cities from a federal
Congressman). Prop. 187’s anti-sanctuary provision states: “Any legislative,
administrative, or other action by a city, county, or other legally authorized local
governmental entity with jurisdictional boundaries, or by a law enforcement agency, to
prevent or limit the cooperation required by subdivision (a) is expressly prohibited.”
Proposition 187, supra note 2 at 91.
52 See, e.g., Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 472 (9th Cir. 1983).
53 See, e.g., id.
54 See id.
50
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without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and based only on their
race and appearance.55 In the course of everyday activities, the plaintiffs
(some of whom were citizens or legal permanent residents) had been
questioned about their immigration status. If they could not produce
proof of legal status, they were arrested and held for Border Patrol
pickup.56 The Ninth Circuit concluded that PPD officers had authority
under federal law to make arrests for criminal immigration violations
(including the crimes of unauthorized entry and reentry after a previous
deportation but excluding mere illegal presence, which is a civil
violation).57 By 1994, other courts issued decisions agreeing with the
Gonzalez distinction between civil and criminal immigration laws.58
In another line of cases during this time period, some courts
interpreted the authority of LEAs to enforce immigration laws more
expansively. In United States v. Salinas-Calderon, the Tenth Circuit
upheld the defendant’s conviction for violating 8 U.S.C. §1324, a
criminal immigration offense.59 In the case, a highway state trooper
stopped the defendant for erratic driving and by questioning the
defendant’s wife, discovered that the passengers in the defendant’s car
lacked lawful immigration status.60 Without any analysis of the
trooper’s authority to make an arrest for an immigration violation (or
any related distinction between civil and criminal laws), the court
summarily concluded that the trooper had probable cause to make the
arrest and dismissed the defendant’s claims.61 Though the Tenth Circuit
based its decision entirely on criminal procedural grounds, SalinasCalderon was cited by other courts for the broad proposition that LEAs
can inquire about immigration status, even during routine traffic
stops.62
55

See id.
See id.
57 See id. at 476. Because the individually named officers were not implicated in the
specific instances cited by the plaintiffs and because the city and other institutional
actors acted in good faith, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for damages.
See id. at 479-80.
58 See, e.g., Gates v. L.A. Superior Court, 193 Cal. App. 3d 205, 214-15 (Ct. App.
1987) (holding that the INS has exclusive authority to enforce civil provisions of the
INA).
59 The offense penalizes “[b]ringing in and harboring certain aliens.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324 (2019). See United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1300-02 (10th
Cir. 1984).
60 Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d at 1299-1300.
61 See id. at 1302.
62 See, e.g., Gomez v. State, 517 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(upholding state officer’s authority to inquire about defendant’s immigration status after
routine traffic stop).
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Against this background of limited enforcement, Section Four’s
provisions were unique. Instead of requiring California LEAs to make
arrests for immigration offenses (like the officers in City of Peoria and
Salinas-Calderon did), Section Four’s mandates operated more
indirectly. Under Section Four, an LEA officer’s immigration duties
were only activated after the officer made an arrest for a nonimmigration offense, as part of his or her usual law enforcement
duties.63 Once that arrest was made, the officer was obligated to check
the immigration status of the arrestee, notify the arrestee of any
unlawful status, and report that information to state and federal
authorities.64 California officers were not required to make arrests for
immigration offenses, civil or criminal.65
The law enforcement provisions were also unique in that they
mandated cooperation at the state level, rather than allowing individual
LEAs to formulate their own policies and procedures.66 Though statemandated immigration cooperation or prohibition procedures are
firmly embedded in today’s legal landscape, there were no such laws in
1994.67 As explained in more detail in Part III, the uniqueness of the
law enforcement cooperation provisions in Prop. 187, combined with
the intense publicity surrounding the initiative’s passage, set the stage
for the broad influence of these provisions.
III. INFLUENCE ON SUBFEDERAL IMMIGRATION COOPERATION
As even casual students of its history know, Prop. 187 was never
enforced. After it was approved by California voters, public interest
groups and individual state residents brought lawsuits, challenging its
constitutionality.68 Consolidating the lawsuits, federal district court
Judge Mariana Pfaelzer enjoined most of its provisions, finding that
63 Though the language of Prop. 187 was not entirely clear, the triggering arrest was
presumably independent of the immigration enforcement duties; that is, an LEA officer
was not supposed to arrest someone solely because the officer “suspected” that the
person lacked lawful immigration status. If Prop. 187 had mandated that LEA officers
make arrests for immigration offenses, the initiative likely would have required the LEA
to hold the arrestees for pickup by federal immigration authorities. Instead, as noted
above, Prop. 187 only required LEAs to verify immigration status of the arrestee, notify
the arrestee of any unlawful status, and report that status to state and federal authorities.
64 See Proposition 187, supra note 2, at 91.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See infra Part III.
68 See Gustavo Arellano, Prop. 187 Timeline: The Rise and Fall of California’s AntiImmigrant Law, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
california/story/2019-10-06/proposition-187-timeline [https://perma.cc/7C24-PAKG].
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those provisions were preempted as unconstitutional immigration
regulations.69 Specifically, she found that all the verification,
notification, and reporting requirements in Prop. 187 had a “direct and
substantial impact on immigration” and were thus preempted by federal
law.70 She allowed the provisions within Prop. 187 that denied benefits
to unauthorized immigrants to proceed, on the grounds that the mere
denial of benefits was not an impermissible regulation of immigration,
as long as the state law used federal definitions of immigrant
eligibility.71 But the law enforcement cooperation provisions were
enjoined in their entirety because “[t]he sole stated purpose and the
sole effect of Section Four is to impermissibly regulate immigration.”72
For a law that was never enforced, Prop. 187 had a broad and deeply
profound impact. Its provisions denying government-funded benefits to
unauthorized immigrants percolated up to the federal level, when
Congress in 1996 enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”) that denied federal
welfare benefits to most unauthorized and authorized noncitizens.73
The initiative’s general promotion of tough immigration enforcement
influenced key provisions in the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), a federal statute enacted in
1996 that greatly expanded the grounds for deportation and limited
avenues for deportation relief.74 And the passage of the initiative is also
credited for mobilizing Latinx political participation, both as voters and

69 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 769-71
(C.D. Cal. 1995).
70 Id.
71 See id. at 770-71. These provisions were later permanently enjoined by the same
district court in 1997, after the enactment of PRA. See League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1254 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
72 League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 771; see also Lolita K. Buckner
Inniss, California’s Proposition 187 — Does It Mean What It Says? Does It Say What It
Means? A Textual and Constitutional Analysis, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 577, 611 (1996)
(analyzing the constitutionality of Prop. 187).
73 See Raquel Aldana, On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the “Alien,” 46 WASHBURN
L.J. 263, 273 (2007) (“California’s Proposition 187, which sought to deny benefits to
the noncitizen, including access to public schools, became the impetus for the 1996
anti-immigrant welfare reforms. Peter Spiro, in particular, describes Proposition 187 as
having the ‘steam valve’ effect of pressuring up local anti-immigrant politics into the
national landscape.”)
74 See Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV.
1627, 1632-33 (1997) (drawing the connection between Prop. 187 and IIRIRA).
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as political candidates, and for turning California into a state clearly
dominated by the Democratic party.75
Like the other provisions of Prop. 187, the Section Four provisions
influenced legislation at both the federal and subfederal levels.76 That
influence resulted in large part from the initiative’s success at the ballot;
politicians who may have been reluctant to discuss immigration policy,
with all of its complicated issues and alliances, could no longer ignore
populist anger directed at federal immigration policies that were
criticized as ineffectual.77 The influence of Prop. 187 was magnified
further by campaigns to enact similar laws in other states; after the
success of Prop. 187 in California, similar laws were proposed in
Florida, Arizona, Oregon, Texas, New York, and Massachusetts.78
Though none of these laws were passed, the public debate generated by
their consideration created more momentum for enforcement-focused
immigration reform.79
Section Four’s impact on federal legislation came more quickly; in
1996, Congress enacted two laws that prohibited restrictions on the
ability of any governmental entity to communicate with the INS
regarding any person’s immigration status.80 Section Four of the
PRWORA provided that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local
law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or
75 See Roxana Kopetman, Politics, Activism, Families: How Prop. 187 Is Still Being
Felt 20 Years Later, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Oct. 31, 2014, 1:20 PM),
https://www.ocregister.com/2014/10/31/politics-activism-families-how-prop-187-isstill-being-felt-20-years-later/ [https://perma.cc/96B2-TURK].
76 “Subfederal” legislation refers to legislation enacted at the state, county, or city
level.
77 See Su, supra note 8, at 1376 (describing how the authors of Prop. 187 were able
to leverage the initiative “into a national controversy that made federal reforms much
more likely”).
78 See Maria Puente, States Setting Stage for Their Own Prop. 187s, USA TODAY, Nov.
18, 1994, at 3A (discussing the campaigns to enact similar laws in Arizona, Texas,
Florida, and New York); Patrick J. McDonnell, Despite Legal Snags, Prop. 187
Reverberates, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 1995, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/
la-xpm-1995-11-08-mn-767-story.html [https://perma.cc/3ERN-XL3M] (noting the
emergence of support for Prop. 187 laws in other states, including Oregon and
Massachusetts).
79 See, e.g., Patrick J. McDonnell, Anti-Illegal Immigration Proposition Fails to Qualify
for Arizona Ballot, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 1996, 12:00 AM), http://articles.latimes.com/
print/1996-07-15/news/mn-24427_1_illegal-immigrants [https://perma.cc/XY4B-NSPG]
(describing the failure of Prop. 187-type laws to make it onto the ballot in Arizona and
Florida).
80 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1644 (2019).
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in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding
the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the
United States.81
Section 642 of the IIRIRA placed more extensive prohibitions on
communications with INS:
(a) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local
law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may
not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or
official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.
(b) Additional authority of government entities
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local
law, no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a
Federal, State, or local government entity from doing any of the
following with respect to information regarding the
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual:
Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such
information from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Maintaining such information.
Exchanging such information with any Federal, State, or local
government entity.
(c) Obligation to respond to inquiries
The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an
inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking
to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration.82
Comparing these federal laws with Prop. 187, the difference in
positions becomes apparent. The federal laws were written from the
position of federal legislators trying to prevent subfederal entities from
81 Codified at § 1644. In a challenge to the Trump administration’s policy to
withhold federal funds from cities that the administration alleged were “sanctuary
cities,” this particular provision was declared unconstitutional, as a violation of the
Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering doctrine. City of Chi. v. Barr, 405 F. Supp.
3d 748, 762-63 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
82 Codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2019).
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restricting INS communications. Prop. 187 was written from the
position of state legislators trying to prevent local entities from
imposing restrictions, after imposing on those local entities the
obligation to cooperate in the first place. But the essence of Prop. 187
Section Four(c) is clearly contained in the federal laws: prohibiting
other governmental entities from enacting laws or policies that would
restrict communication with the then-INS.83 The legislative history of
both federal laws indicate that Congress intended to nullify the policies
enacted by cities and states as part of the sanctuary movement of the
1980s and 1990s discussed above.84 Section Four(c) provided Congress
with the anti-sanctuary legislative tool to assert itself into that debate.
The more consequential impact of Prop. 187’s law enforcement
cooperation provisions, however, was to plant the idea that subfederal
governmental entities could play an important role in immigration law
enforcement. Section Four of Prop. 187 created a role for LEAs in the
immigration enforcement scheme by mandating that they verify the
immigration status of arrestees, notify the arrestees of any unlawful
status, and then report that unauthorized status to state and federal
authorities.85 The third step of reporting was designed to compel federal
immigration authorities to step up enforcement of federal immigrations
laws that were criticized as ineffectual.86
For a Congress with a get-tough-on-immigration mindset, the
possibility of recruiting state and local police to help enforce
immigration laws proved to be enticing. So as part of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Congress created the 287(g) program, through which a state or other
political subdivision could become deputized to enforce federal
immigration laws.87 Section 287(g) authorizes the Attorney General

83 Prop. 187 Section Four(c) provides as follows: (c) Any legislative, administrative,
or other action by a city, county, or other legally authorized local governmental entity
with jurisdictional boundaries, or by a law enforcement agency, to prevent or limit the
cooperation required by subdivision (a) is expressly prohibited. Proposition 187, supra
note 2, at 91.
84 For example, the legislative history of Section Four acknowledged that “various
localities have enacted laws preventing local officials from disclosing the immigration
status of individuals to INS” and stated that Section Four was designed to “prevent any
State or local law, ordinance, executive order, policy, constitutional provision, or
decision of any Federal or State court that prohibits or in any way restricts any
communication between State and local officials and the INS.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-725,
at 383 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2771.
85 Proposition 187, supra note 2, at 91.
86 See id.
87 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2019).
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(now the Secretary of Homeland Security) to enter into agreements with
a state or political subdivision “to perform a function of an immigration
officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of
aliens in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens
across State lines to detention centers) . . . .”88 The Department of
Homeland Security and the state or political subdivision are to negotiate
the specifics of any delegated immigration functions, and that
agreement will be memorialized in a written agreement.89
Though there is very little legislative history specific to the 287(g)
program,90 we can see the influence of Prop. 187’s Section Four in the
very idea that the 287(g) program puts forward — that LEAs could and
should be involved in immigration law enforcement. As noted in Part
II, when Prop. 187 was being formulated, the concept that LEAs should
have a regular role in immigration law enforcement just did not exist.
Rather, the norm among LEAs was one of nonenforcement; any forays
by LEAs into immigration enforcement were sporadic, with
enforcement decisions made by individual LEAs scattered across the
United States.91 Against that context, Prop. 187 was groundbreaking for
mandating LEA participation in immigration enforcement on a
statewide basis. And two years after Prop. 187 was approved by
California voters, Congress created a program built around the same
idea of regularized LEA involvement in immigration enforcement,
providing strong evidence of Prop. 187’s influence.92

88

Id.
See id. § 1357(g)(5).
90 See Huyen Pham, 287(g) Agreements in the Trump Era, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1253, 1257 (2018) (noting the lack of legislative history regarding the origins of the
287(g) program).
91 See supra notes 32–51.
92 Of course, the 287(g) program differs in significant ways from the enforcement
scheme envisioned by the authors of Prop. 187: the 287(g) program is a voluntary
program, requiring the voluntary participation of any signatory LEA and the approval
of the federal government. Moreover, the 287(g) program deputizes LEA officers to
directly enforce immigration laws under federal direction (e.g., by serving a Notice to
Appear that starts removal proceedings), while Prop. 187 anticipated that officers would
only report unauthorized immigrants to federal authorities (who would then decide
whether to pursue enforcement). As the creator of the 287(g) program, Congress has
the authority to delegate immigration enforcement power, which the state of California
obviously didn’t. However, because of the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth
Amendment, Congress could not require LEAs to enforce immigration laws, while
California presumably could impose enforcement requirements on political
subdivisions within the state. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1357; Proposition 187, supra note
2, at 55.
89
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An examination of Prop. 187’s influence on subfederal immigration
enforcement must necessarily account for the impact of the 9/11
terrorist attacks. Those 2001 attacks forever changed the trajectory of
U.S. immigration policy generally and the path of subfederal
immigration enforcement more specifically. After the attacks by
nineteen foreign terrorists, all of whom had entered the U.S. legally on
tourist, business, or student visas, U.S. immigration policy became
increasingly viewed through the lens of national security.93 Citing
national security concerns, restrictionists pushed for laws that made it
more difficult to immigrate legally and for laws that increased the
penalties for those who immigrated illegally.94 Gradually the security
justifications expanded from concerns focused on foreign terrorists to
broader concerns about dangerous criminal immigrants more
generally.95
The emergence of subfederal immigration enforcement as an issue of
national concern is due, in large part, to the 9/11 attacks.96 Shortly after
those attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft invited state and local
police to join federal authorities in enforcing both civil and criminal
immigration laws. States, the Department of Justice concluded, had
“inherent authority” to enforce immigration laws.97 Though he limited
this invitation to “our narrow anti-terrorism mission,” his
announcement signaled a substantial shift in the federal government’s
legal position on this issue98 and a new federal willingness to embrace
subfederal activity in immigration enforcement. Troubled by the 9/11
attacks and encouraged by the federal government, Florida in 2002
93 See Robert Farley, 9/11 Hijackers and Student Visas, FACTCHECK.ORG (Nov. 24, 2015),
https://www.factcheck.org/2013/05/911-hijackers-and-student-visas/ [https://perma.cc/
Q3QW-CLNX].
94 See Walter A. Ewing, Beyond Border Enforcement: Enhancing National Security
Through Immigration Reform, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 427 (2007) (describing the
national security focus of immigration reform).
95 See id. (describing the national security focus of immigration reform).
96 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Prepared Remarks on
the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002), available at
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm
[https://perma.cc/GH5V-27HX] (encouraging local law enforcement authorities to join
in enforcing federal immigration laws).
97 Id.
98 Id.; see Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to U.S. Attorney,
S. Dist. Of Cal., Memorandum Opinion from Teresa Wynn Roseborough, Assistance by
State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens II.B (Feb. 5, 1996), available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1996/02/31/op-olc-v020p0026_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2KL-E758] (opining that local police have authority to
enforce criminal, but not civil, provisions of the INA).
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became the first subfederal entity to sign a 287(g) agreement, a full six
years after the 287(g) program was created.99
In addition to participating in federal programs, subfederal
governments in the post 9/11 era also passed laws that imposed
independent enforcement duties on their LEAs, and it’s in these laws
that we see Prop. 187’s strongest state-level influence. In 2010, Arizona
enacted SB 1070, an omnibus bill that, among other provisions, requires
all LEAs in Arizona to check the immigration status of all persons whom
LEA officers encounter in lawful stops if there is “reasonable suspicion”
that the person lacks lawful immigration status.100 Five other states —
Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah — passed
similarly restrictive laws.101

99 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dep’t of Justice and the
State of Fla. (July 29, 2002), reprinted in 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1138, app. II at 1140
(2002). These officers were trained by the INS and then placed in Florida’s seven
Regional Domestic Security Task Forces. See id. at 1140-41.
100 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
101 See Melissa Keaney & Alvaro M. Huerta, Restrictionist States Rebuked: How
Arizona v. United States Reins in States on Immigration, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 249,
256 (2013).
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Table 1
Prop. 187
Antisanctuary
Check
status
Notify
“alien”
Report to
INS/ICE

Ariz.
SB 1070102

Ala.
HB 56103

Ga.
HB 87104

Ind.
SB 590105

S.C.
SB 20106

Utah
HB 497107

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

X

X

X

X

X

X

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Table 1 above compares the substantive provisions of these laws.
There are a few differences worth noting. None of the later laws required
LEAs to inform arrestees of their unlawful status or of their obligation
to obtain lawful status, perhaps because the enforcement efficacy of that
requirement is suspect. Moreover, the later laws appear to have learned
from the legal problems that plagued Prop. 187. Section Four was
enjoined by the district court in part because it required LEA officers to
try to determine by themselves who lacked lawful immigration status, a
determination that may or may not align with federal standards, and
was thus preempted as an impermissible immigration regulation.108 In
contrast, SB 1070 and similar laws require LEAs to verify lawful
immigration status by directly communicating with ICE. In
implementing these laws then, LEAs are necessarily applying federal
standards regarding immigration status.109
And while the immigrant burden cited to justify Prop. 187 was
primarily financial (through the provision of state services), the burden
cited to justify SB 1070 and related laws was primarily the perceived
threats presented by criminal immigrants. When signing SB 1070 into
law, the governor of Arizona described in vivid detail the alleged
criminal threats posed by unauthorized immigrants: “There is no higher
priority than protecting the citizens of Arizona. We cannot sacrifice our
safety to the murderous greed of drug cartels. We cannot stand idly by
102

Ariz. S.B. 1070.
H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011).
104 H.B. 87, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011).
105 S.B. 590, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011).
106 S.B. 20, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011).
107 H.B. 497, 2011 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011).
108 See supra notes 65–66.
109 See, e.g., S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (noting that the Arizona
legislature recognizes an interest in enforcing federal immigration laws in Arizona).
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as drop houses, kidnappings and violence compromise our quality of
life.”110
As shown in Table 1 above, however, the similarities among these
state laws outweigh their differences. The later laws incorporated most
of the substance of Prop. 187 Section Four.111 The basic enforcement
scheme envisioned by Prop. 187 in 1994 — a mandate to LEA officers
requiring them to verify and report unauthorized immigrants to federal
immigration authorities — has been incorporated into SB 1070 and its
progeny. Similarly, the mandated enforcement provided for in all of
these laws set up the state as the savior against unauthorized
immigration. As noted in Part I, the authors of Prop. 187 pitched the
initiative as necessary to send a message to a federal government that
was unwilling to enforce immigration laws;112 similarly, SB 1070 and
the later laws also faulted the federal government for inaction and
characterized the State as the only capable actor in the crisis.113 When
Governor Brewer signed SB 1070 into law, she made repeated references
to federal government inaction:
•

“Senate Bill 1070 . . . represents another tool for our
state to use as we work to solve a crisis we did not create
and the federal government has refused to fix.”

•

“We in Arizona have been more than patient waiting for
Washington to act. But decades of federal inaction and
misguided policy have created a dangerous and
unacceptable situation.”114

The similarities in both substance and structure between Prop. 187,
passed in 1994, and the SB 1070 line of laws enacted over sixteen years
later speaks to the pervasive and long lasting influence of Prop. 187’s
Section Four.
CONCLUSION
As we contemplate the legacy of Prop. 187, we need to pay particular
attention to Section Four, the law enforcement cooperation provisions.
Section Four is often overlooked as commentators focus on the service
110

Brewer Signs SB 1070 - Illegal Immigration Bill, supra note 19.
See H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011); H.B. 87, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); S.B. 590, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011); S.C.
S.B. 20, 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011); Utah H.B. 497, 2011 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011).
112 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
113 See Brewer Signs SB 1070 - Illegal Immigration Bill, supra note 19.
114 Id.
111
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denial provisions of the initiative. But Section Four — by mandating
that local enforcement agencies in California verify the immigration
status of all arrestees “suspected” of unlawful status and then report any
unlawful status to state and federal authorities — laid the foundation
for regularizing the role of LEAs in immigration law enforcement.115
The wide-ranging influence of Section Four on later legislation is
apparent at both the federal and state levels. At the federal level,
Congress created the 287(g) program, allowing for voluntary
cooperation between ICE and subfederal LEAs, and enacted a federal
anti-sanctuary law, to prevent subfederal restrictions on
communication between LEAs and ICE. At the state level, states like
Arizona have enacted laws that mandate LEA participation in
immigration law enforcement, with provisions that strongly echo what
Section Four of Prop. 187 proposed to do. The combined policy effects
of these state and federal efforts — the increased deportations, the
heightened risks of racial profiling, and the widening distrust between
immigrant communities and LEAs — are perhaps the most powerful
and troubling legacies of Prop. 187’s Section Four provisions.

115

See supra Part III.

